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This article considers the High Court decision of Cattanach v 
Melchior, which permitted the recovery of damages for the cost of 
raising a child born through medical negligence. It discusses the 
reasoning in each of the judgments and seeks to identify themes so 
as to explain the divide between the majority and minority. It also 
considers the impact of legislative intervention in Queensland and 
New South Wales. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the decision of Cattanach v Melchior,2 the High Court decided that parents 
should be able to recover damages for the cost of raising an unplanned child 
who was born as a result of negligent advice about a sterilisation procedure. 
 
The case is a controversial one attracting attention not only from lawyers but 
also the media and the general public. Politicians have also weighed into the 
debate with a number of political leaders making strong statements about the 
need to legislate to overturn the decision.3 
 
The question is indeed a difficult one and this is reflected in the different 
approaches within the High Court. That six separate, and very different, 
judgments were delivered indicates the diversity of opinion. It is for this reason 
that it is worth examining each of the judgments in some detail. 
FACTS AND HISTORY 
 
Mr and Mrs Melchior were married in 1984 and had two daughters in 1985 
and 1988 respectively. For various reasons, they decided to limit their family 
to two. In the face what she felt was her husband’s procrastination, Mrs 
Melchior was referred to Dr Cattanach by her general practitioner for a 
sterilisation procedure.  
 
During a consultation, Mrs Melchior told Dr Cattanach that her right ovary and 
fallopian tube had been removed during an appendectomy that occurred 
when she was fifteen. In fact, only her ovary had been removed and the right 
                                            
1 Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Law, QUT. 
2 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 (16 July 2003). Now reported at (2003) 199 ALR 131. 
3 See for example, ‘Carr Seeks to Protect Doctors’, Australian Financial Review, 18 July 2003 
and ‘Birth Law to Restrict Liability of Doctors’, Courier Mail, 18 July 2003, which note adverse 
comments about the case by the Attorney-General Mr Rod Welford MP, the Deputy Prime 
Minister Mr John Andersen MP and by the New South Wales Premier Mr Bob Carr MP. 
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fallopian tube remained intact. An ultrasound scan revealed no evidence of 
the right fallopian tube being present.  
 
Later, a tubal ligation was conducted successfully on the left fallopian tube. 
During this operation, Dr Cattanach found no evidence of the right fallopian 
tube being present and intact. However, the right tube was in fact still present 
although it was obscured by bowel adhesions resulting from the 
appendectomy. The tube was convoluted, compressed and not in its usual 
position. 
 
A finding of negligence was made because Dr Cattanach had too readily and 
uncritically accepted the patient’s assertion that the right fallopian tube had 
been removed. Important facts were that Mrs Melchior was only fifteen at the 
time of her appendectomy operation, that this assertion was made 25 years 
later, and that there was no positive confirmation of the tube’s removal during 
the operation. The trial judge, Holmes J, concluded that a reasonable doctor 
would have advised her of the increased risk of getting pregnant, having not 
been able to confirm the absence of the right fallopian tube. She also found 
that a reasonable doctor would have advised Mrs Melchior of the possibility of 
investigating this further. There was a procedure called a 
hysterosalpingogram, which if conducted, would have revealed the existence 
of the right fallopian tube.  
 
Mrs Melchior fell pregnant and gave birth to Jordan, who is a normal, healthy, 
active child in all respects. 
 
Holmes J awarded damages to Mrs Melchior associated with the physical 
damage and consequential economic loss that arose out of the pregnancy 
and birth. She also awarded damages to Mr Melchior for loss of consortium. 
Finally, Holmes J also awarded damages to both Mr and Mrs Melchior for the 
cost of raising Jordan until he was 18.4 
 
Dr Cattanach appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal challenging 
Holmes J’s finding that he had been negligent, and on the awarding of 
damages for the cost of raising Jordan.5 On the issue of liability, McMurdo P, 
Davies JA and Thomas JA all agreed that the appeal should be dismissed.6 
The appeal was also dismissed in relation to the awarding of damages for the 
cost of raising a child, although Thomas JA dissented on this point. 
 
Dr Cattanach appealed to the High Court, and the sole issue for its 
consideration was whether damages for the cost of raising a child should be 
awarded. 
                                            
4 Melchior & Anor v Cattanach & Anor [2000] QSC 285 at [81] where Holmes J summarises 
the damages awarded. 
5 Melchior v Cattanach & Anor [2001] QCA 246. 
6 Although Thomas JA did so ‘with some reservation’: Melchior v Cattanach & Anor [2001] 
QCA 246 at [132-133]. 
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THE HIGH COURT: THE MAJORITY 
 
A majority of McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ dismissed the appeal 
and confirmed that damages may be awarded to a parent for the cost of 
raising a child born as a result of medical negligence. 
MCHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ 
 
McHugh and Gummow JJ started from the premise that ‘the appellants would 
be liable under ordinary principles for the foreseeable consequences of Dr 
Cattanach’s negligence.’7 It was necessary, therefore, to show some 
compelling policy reasons for creating an exception to established law.  
 
The relevant policy reasons identified included the importance of human life, 
the stability of the family unit and the nurture of the infant child until his or her 
legal majority.8 McHugh and Gummow JJ accepted that these considerations 
were important, but felt that the critical question was whether these 
considerations should actually preclude recovery of this head of damages.9 
The judgment cautioned against the ‘beguiling but misleading simplicity to 
invoke broad values which few would deny and then glide to the conclusion 
that they should operate to shield …’ a person from the full legal 
consequences of negligence.10 
 
McHugh and Gummow JJ concluded that these public policy considerations 
relied upon by Dr Cattanach did not justify a refusal to award these damages. 
In reaching this conclusion, they identified some important limits or flaws in 
the reasoning that underpinned these policy considerations. One was to reject 
the suggested characterisation of the parent-child relationship as being the 
relevant damage suffered in this case. Such a characterisation leads to the 
conclusion that, as a matter of policy, this is a loss that the law should not 
recognise. McHugh and Gummow JJ rejected that approach and instead 
thought that the actual loss suffered was better described as being the past 
and future expenditure on their child.11  
 
The argument that the birth of a child is always a blessing was also rejected 
as this is inconsistent with permitting compensation for the pregnancy itself, 
and it is also inconsistent with the widespread use of contraception.12 
Concerns about possible harm to familial relationships should Jordan become 
aware of the litigation were also rejected because without any evidence or 
clear understanding on this point, it was merely speculation.13 McHugh and 
Gummow JJ also criticised the inconsistency between the policy arguments 
that value the importance of human life and the reliance by Dr Cattanach on 
                                            
7 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [51]. 
8 Ibid, as summarised at [76]. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid at [77]. 
11 Ibid at [67]. 
12 Ibid at [79]. 
13 Ibid. 
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the child being born healthy. A decision to award damages or not depending 
on the health of a child undermined the strength of those policy arguments, as 
this suggested that the value of human life may be less if the child is 
disabled.14 
 
A subsidiary argument also rejected by McHugh and Gummow JJ was that if 
such damages were awarded, then they must be set off against the benefits 
of having a healthy child.15 The joy of having a child was not the ‘same 
interest’ as the cost of raising him or her. The two were not comparable and 
so were not capable of being set off against each other.16  
KIRBY J 
 
Kirby J’s review of legal authority from around the world revealed that the 
majority of jurisdictions have adopted various mechanisms to exclude, at least 
to some extent, damages for the cost of raising a child born as a result of 
negligence in sterilisation.17 However, these mechanisms generally involve an 
arbitrary cut-off point after which damages are not recoverable.18 Further, this 
point is often determined by reference to what Kirby J regards as 
inappropriate ethical or moral considerations.19 Although legislatures may be 
able to establish such cut-off points,20 judges are not permitted to adopt 
arbitrary departures from established legal doctrine. Their obligation is to 
develop the law in a manner consistent with past decisions.21  
 
In this case, the loss was not pure economic loss because it flowed from the 
physical injury that resulted from negligent advice.22 Accordingly, the decision 
should be made using the ordinary principles of negligence23 which, in this 
case, permitted recovery. Any departure from this established position 
required strong and clear public policy reasons. Those advocating such a 
departure were not successful in justifying this step as a matter of law. 
Instead, much of the argument in favour of precluding recovery of these 
damages proceeded on the basis of ‘personal religious beliefs or “moral” 
assessments concealed in an inarticulate premise dressed up, and described, 
as legal principle or legal policy.’24 These considerations did not justify a 
failure to apply established law. 
                                            
14 Ibid at [78]. 
15 Ibid at [54]. 
16 Ibid, for example, at [90]. 
17 Ibid at [134]. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Examples cited include references to the Bible and the supposed opinion of the passenger 
on the London Underground: Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [135]. 
20 See below for the position in Queensland and New South Wales after legislative 
intervention. 
21 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [137]. 
22 Ibid at [148-9]. 
23 That is, without the need to resort to the special tests that govern the recovery of pure 
economic loss: Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [150]. 
24 Ibid at [137]. 
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The review of past legal authorities revealed five competing choices, which 
Kirby J addressed in turn. The first choice was to preclude recovery of any 
damages (including those associated with the pregnancy) where the child is 
born healthy. Most of the arguments for this choice reflected an opinion that 
the birth of a baby is a blessing, not a detriment, so it is offensive to seek 
compensation for the cost of raising the child.25 The blessing argument has 
two aspects.26 The first is that a blessing cannot constitute ‘harm’ because 
this would require the court to conclude that the parent would be better off if 
the child hadn’t been born. The second aspect is that any harm is 
overwhelmed by the joy of the child. Kirby J’s response to this, however, was 
that the harm is not the child but his or her economic consequences.27 
Further, refusal to permit recovery of any damages would create an 
undesirable zone of legal immunity for doctors engaged in sterilisation.28 
 
Other subsidiary arguments put forward in support of the option of awarding 
no damages were also addressed by Kirby. The difficulties identified in 
calculating the cost of raising a child were rejected as the courts already 
assess other nebulous heads of damages and in any event, these 
calculations are already available having been compiled in other contexts.29 
Concerns that a child may feel unwanted if he or she hears about the litigation 
were rejected as unconvincing, particularly as the distinction between suing 
for an unwanted child and the economic costs of raising a child can be 
explained.30 Finally, worries that litigation may encourage parents to love their 
children less were considered ‘sheer judicial fantasy’ and not supported by 
real world evidence.31 
 
A second option was to award damages but to draw a line soon after the 
delivery of the child. This is the position in the United Kingdom after 
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (‘McFarlane’),32 although the individual 
judges in the House of Lords did not agree upon what these damages will 
include.33 In jurisdictions that adopt this approach, the justification for drawing 
the line between the costs associated with pregnancy and the cost of raising a 
child was usually not articulated. Generally, there is only ‘a passing nod 
towards the law’s respect for the sanctity of life, the blessings of children and 
                                            
25 Ibid at [141-2]. 
26 Ibid at [147]. 
27 Ibid at [148]. 
28 Ibid at [149-150]. 
29 Ibid at [144]. 
30 Ibid at [145]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. McFarlane was recently affirmed in 
Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52 (16 October 2003), subject 
to an ‘important gloss’. That gloss was to recognise that although the cost of raising the child 
should not be recoverable, a legal wrong had still been suffered beyond the cost of the actual 
birth and that that wrong should be recognised by a conventional award of 15 000 pounds 
(see Further Developments below). 
33 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [156-158]. 
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the important of the family unit, and occasional invocations of Scripture.’34 
Kirby J rejected this option as ‘arbitrary and unjust’ as there is no principled 
reason for making this distinction.35 
 
A third option permitted recovery for the costs of raising a child with a 
disability, beyond those associated with the normal costs of a healthy child. 
Kirby J rejected this distinction because it is arbitrary36 and because it 
reinforces negative views about disability that are inconsistent with the values 
of Australian law.37 A further argument against this was difficulties that have 
arisen in the United Kingdom where this option has been adopted by some 
courts after McFarlane.38 The difficulties in maintaining coherence and 
consistency in this area of law when taking such an approach provide a 
warning for the courts in Australia.39 
 
A fourth option involved assessing the ‘net’ loss suffered, which entails 
reducing the cost of raising the child in light of the emotional benefits he or 
she brings.40 In McFarlane, some judges used this approach to conclude that 
the benefits entirely outweigh the disadvantages so no damages should be 
recovered at all.41 This approach was not adopted by Kirby J because it 
involves set offing incomparable benefits and burdens.42 Such an option is 
inconsistent with Australian law and cannot be justified by existing legal 
principle.43 
 
The final option, and the one adopted by Kirby J, was that damages for the 
cost of raising a child should be recoverable.44 Having rejected the policy 
arguments put forward to justify a departure from established legal principle, 




Callinan J characterised the claim as one for economic loss46 and because all 
of the considerations in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd47 permitted recovery, damages 
                                            
34 Ibid at [159]. 
35 Ibid at [162]. 
36 Ibid at [164]. 
37 Ibid at [166]. 
38 See, for example, Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] 
QB 266. 
39 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [128] and [163]. 
40 Ibid at [168]. 
41 Ibid at [170]. 
42 Ibid at [172]. 
43 Ibid at [173]. 
44 Ibid at [176]. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid at [299] and [302]. 
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for the cost of raising the child should be awarded.48 Although the 
preponderance of the international authorities precluding recovery should not 
be disregarded lightly,49 ‘[n]o identifiable, universal principle of public policy 
dictates any different result’ than recognising this head of damages.50 
 
In evaluating the different considerations raised in this area, Callinan J 
observed that almost all of the arguments denying recovery of these damages 
draw on ‘emotional and moral values and perceptions’ of public policy.51 
However, he found that these arguments did not ‘commend themselves in 
law’ to him.52 For example, just because damages are hard to assess with 
precision, or at all, did not preclude recovery because the courts already 
make assessments of these kinds.53 In any event, the cost of raising a child is 
not that difficult to assess with some precision.54  
 
Further, the benefits of parenthood cannot be equated to, or set off against, 
the financial cost of rearing the child.55 Nor was there reason to think that 
such a child will not be as loved if the parents are compensated for the cost of 
his or her upbringing.56 A final example was that there are many harsher 
truths for children to deal with than that they were not wanted at the moment 
of their conception.57 In addition to his reservations about the public policy 
reasons used to justify precluding an award of these damages, Callinan J also 
pointed to the need to avoid legal immunity for doctors performing this kind of 
work.58  
THE HIGH COURT: THE MINORITY 
 
A minority of Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ disagreed and refused to 
permit recovery of these damages. 
GLEESON CJ 
 
Gleeson CJ classified the claim as one for economic loss and relied heavily 
on the fact that it was a joint award to both Mr and Mrs Melchior, rather than 
being loss simply consequential upon Mrs Melchior’s physical damage 
                                                                                                                             
47 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180. Perre outlines a number of touchstones that 
indicate when recovery should be permitted and some disqualifying conditions that suggest 
when recovery should be refused. 
48 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [299]. 
49 Ibid at [297]. 
50 Ibid at [299]. 
51 Ibid at [292]. 
52 Ibid at [301]. 
53 Ibid at [297], cf [292]. 
54 Ibid at [297]. 
55 Ibid at [298], cf [292]. 
56 Ibid at [298]. 
57 Ibid at [301], cf [292] 
58 Ibid at [295]. 
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through pregnancy.59 Therefore, because it was a ‘claim for recovery of pure 
economic loss arising out of a relationship, then it can scarcely be asserted 
with any degree of plausibility that legal principle or authority leads inexorably 
to the result…’ that the cost of raising their child was compensable.60 Pure 
economic loss categories develop incrementally and it must be demonstrated 
that this new category should be recoverable. Gleeson CJ concluded that the 
below policy considerations should not permit an incremental development of 
the common law to permit recovery of these damages.61 Informing this 
exercise was the conclusion that an integral aspect of the damage sustained 
by the Melchiors was the parent-child relationship.62 
 
In deciding whether this damage should be recognised, the policy 
considerations that limit recovery in cases of pure economic loss were 
considered. The first policy consideration was that the law seeks to avoid 
recognising loss that could be indeterminate.63 Gleeson CJ pointed to the 
potential for other wide reaching claims for compensation such as those 
covering loss occurring after the child’s 18th birthday, the adverse impact of a 
child on his or her parents’ careers and the potential cost of weddings or other 
similar expenses.64 
 
A second policy consideration was that the law is reluctant to recognise loss 
that is incapable of precise definition.65 It is very difficult to measure 
accurately the impact that a child has on the lives of his or her parents and 
which of these changes would count as economic harm capable of being 
compensated.66 There is also the possibility that the child upon reaching 
maturity may in fact provide financial benefits for the parent.67 A third policy 
consideration was that the law seeks to ensure when recognising loss that 
such recognition will relate coherently with other rules of the common law and 
statute.68 Gleeson CJ argued that recognition of this head of damages was 
inconsistent with the law’s refusal to recognise a child’s own birth as 
actionable and the general duties imposed by law on parents to take care of 
their children.69 
 
Another more general consideration in this area was how or whether the loss 
of the Melchiors should be measured. Reasonable restitution is all that can be 
required to compensate their loss but this raised the issue of how the 
emotional and other benefits of the child should be accounted for: an issue of 
                                            
59 Ibid at [19]. 
60 Ibid at [30]. 
61 Ibid at [39]. 
62 Ibid at [25]. 
63 Ibid at [32]. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid at [33]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at [34]. 
68 Ibid at [35]. 
69 Ibid. 
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set offs.70 Gleeson CJ was of the view that compensation cannot be provided 
for the financial disadvantages while ignoring the other advantages of 
parenthood.71 Further, the parental relationship was not regarded by the 
community as being primarily a financial relationship.72 Indeed, it is a human 
relationship seen as being fundamental to society.73 Therefore to ‘seek to 




Hayne J’s starting premise was that if Mrs Melchior suffered loss due to 
negligence, then justification was needed to deny the recovery of damages for 
that loss.75 He argued against resolving this question by classifying the claim 
and indeed, specifically did not categorise it as a claim for pure economic 
loss.76 
 
Before addressing his main argument, Hayne J considered some of the 
arguments generally put forward as being relevant to the claim as well as the 
corresponding criticisms. Those addressed included the ‘blessing’ argument,77 
concerns about setting off and the impossibility of accurately predicting the 
loss suffered,78 worries about damaging the child,79 the motives of the parents 
in seeking sterilisation80 and suggestions that the child could have been 
aborted or adopted.81 In the course of discussing these matters, Hayne J 
concluded that neither the arguments nor the counter arguments denied that a 
child brings both burdens and benefits to his or her parents.82 
 
Hayne J’s main argument was that considerations of public policy decide this 
case.83 He traced the role of public policy in the development of the common 
law and concluded that it was a legitimate source for judges to draw upon 
when making these sorts of choices.84 His public policy argument to preclude 
recovery was made in two steps. The first step was to find that the 
consequences of Dr Cattanach’s negligence brought both detriments and 
benefits. To focus only on economic detriments and ignore non economic 
                                            
70 Ibid at [36]. 
71 Ibid at [37]. 
72 Ibid at [38]. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid at [192]. 
76 Ibid at [193]. 
77 Ibid at [195]-[197]. 
78 Ibid at [199]-[201]. 
79 Ibid at [202]-[204]. 
80 Ibid at [205]-[210]. 
81 Ibid at [220]-[222]. 
82 Ibid, for example, at [197], [201]. 
83 Ibid at [194]. Although he acknowledged the overlap that public policy has with those 
arguments discussed earlier in his judgment. 
84 Ibid at [227]. 
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benefits did not take sufficient account of the full consequences of that 
negligence.85  
 
The second step then sought to evaluate the loss to the parent and argued 
that all burdens and benefits, both economic and non economic, should be 
considered, in spite of any difficulties in measuring them.86 It may be 
impossible to set off these benefits and burdens, in which case no value can 
be sensibly attributed to the claim.87 Alternatively, if some reasonable 
assessment can be made, then the law must choose if it wishes to allow that 
calculation to take place.88 Hayne J concluded that it should not ‘because it 
would be necessary to put a price on the value to the parent of the new life.’89 
In reaching this conclusion, he adopted the quote of Lord Millett in McFarlane:  
 
‘If the monetary value of the child is assessed at a sum in excess of the 
costs of maintaining him, the exercise merely serves to confirm what 
most courts have been willing to assume without it. On the other hand, 
if the court assesses the monetary value of the child at a sum less than 
the costs of maintaining him, it will have accepted the unedifying 
proposition that the child is not worth the cost of looking after him.’90 
 
Hayne J decided that public policy should prevent parents from harming their 
child by being able to prove that the burdens of raising him or her outweigh 
the benefits.91 Interestingly, he specifically addressed the issue of a child with 
‘special needs’ and concluded that additional costs over and beyond those 
associated with the rearing of a normal child may be recoverable.92  
HEYDON J 
 
In rejecting recovery of these damages, Heydon J identified a number of 
errors in the reasoning of the majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal. The 
first was that it ‘failed to take sufficient account of the law’s assumptions about 
some key values in family life’.93 The law assumes that children’s interests 
prevail over other interests, that parents have significant duties to their 
children, that those interests are best advanced by nurture in a stable 
marriage, and that publicity connected with litigation involving children should 
be avoided.94 The courts have intervened throughout history to protect 
                                            
85 Ibid at [248]. 
86 Ibid at [249]-[250]. 
87 Ibid at [250]. 
88 Ibid at [251]. 
89 Ibid at [255] (original emphasis). 
90 Ibid at [257], quoting Lord Millett in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 at 
111. 
91 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [259]. 
92 Ibid at [256]. Hayne J suggests that those additional costs to meet these needs do not 
deny or diminish the benefits of being a parent to the child. [263] 
93 Ibid at [322]. 
94 Ibid at [323]. 
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children and their interests, including where those interests have conflicted 
with the interest of their parents.95 
 
A second error made by the Court of Appeal was that it failed to consider the 
type of litigation that awarding these sorts of damages would permit.96 To 
maximise recovery, parents may hold out ‘unrealisable hopes’ which their 
children will never achieve.97 Parents may also claim of family traditions (or 
create them after the birth) which will unreasonably increase their damages.98 
Finally, parents may exaggerate the physical or mental incapacities of their 
child to maximise damages.99 Litigation of this sort, and the claims it would 
encourage, is in conflict with the interests of children already described.100 
  
Heydon J concluded that these errors lead to the reasoning of majority of the 
Court of Appeal being invalid for three reasons.101 The first reason was that it 
is not possible to treat the costs of raising a child as damage.102 The nature of 
the child, the nature of the parent-child relationship and the duties that arise 
on human birth make it wrong to place a value on human life or the expense 
of human life.103 The second reason was based upon the undesirable 
temptations for parents to make claims in litigation that are contrary to the 
child’s best interests already discussed.104 It was thought that this sort of 
litigation would create an ‘odious spectacle’.105 
 
The third and final reason put forward by Heydon J as to why the reasoning of 
the majority of the Court of Appeal was invalid was because of the negative 
impact on the child upon learning of the litigation.106 After considering a range 
of judicial opinions expressed in many different jurisdictions, and after 
critiquing the arguments relied upon in the Court of Appeal, Heydon J 
concluded that permitting such damages should be refused because this 
‘would tend to damage the natural love and mutual confidence which the law 
seeks to foster between parent and child.’107 
 
One inconsistency in refusing this head of damages but permitting more 
general recovery of damages for the pregnancy is that a child may still learn 
of the litigation.108 Heydon J acknowledged this concern but suggested that a 
partial answer is that this is a ‘justifiable compromise’ that recognises the 
                                            
95 Ibid at, for example, [324]-[325]. 
96 Ibid at [322], [339]. 
97 Ibid at [344]. 
98 Ibid at [345]. 
99 Ibid at [346]. 
100 Ibid at [339]. 
101 Ibid at [347]. 
102 Ibid at [352]. 
103 Ibid at [352]-[353]. 
104 Ibid at, for example, [371].  
105 Ibid at [347]. 
106 Ibid at [373]. 
107 Ibid at [404]. 
108 Ibid at [410]. 
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mother’s loss but does not involve any consideration of the child in the 
litigation.109 Alternatively, perhaps this inconsistency demonstrates that the 
entire claim should not be recognised.110 
THEMES 
 
In a case where the High Court delivers six separate judgments, one of the 
challenges is to identify particular themes that unite or divide the seven 
judges. A critical difference in the legal reasoning of the majority and the 
minority was whether the economic burdens of raising a child can or should 
be set off against non financial factors. Each of the minority judges, and 
particularly Hayne J, relied on the impossibility or inappropriateness of 
balancing the economic cost of a child against his or her non economic 
consequences. This meant that damages of this kind either could not or 
should not be awarded. 
 
By contrast, the majority judges were able to avoid this balancing exercise by 
finding that such a set off was not permitted by law. Comparing dissimilar 
factors was described ‘comparing apples to oranges’.111 Accordingly, it was 
permissible for the award of damages to be determined purely on the 
economic cost of the child, without, for example, having to subtract the benefit 
of the joy and happiness that he or she brings to his or her parents. This 
finding was a critical one because it is very unlikely that all (or indeed any) of 
the majority judges would have been comfortable recognising these damages 
if they had been obliged to engage in these kinds of calculations.  
 
But not all themes in the judgments accurately reflect the majority-minority 
divide that decided the case. A good example is how the issue of whether 
such damages should be awarded or not was approached. All of the majority 
tackled the question with an initial view that the ordinary principles of 
negligence permit the awarding of these damages unless there were cogent 
reasons otherwise. Interestingly, this was also the view of Hayne J from the 
minority. Only Gleeson CJ and Heydon J disagreed. Gleeson CJ treated the 
claim as one for pure economic loss, and as the categories of that loss 
develop incrementally, it was for the Melchiors to show why this new head of 
damages should be recognised.112 Heydon J seemed to accept that such an 
award involved a new step in the law, and so cast a burden on the plaintiffs to 
justify it.113 
 
A better example of diverging opinions within the majority and minority views, 
and indeed within the court as a whole, was on the issue of whether the claim 
should be regarded as pure economic loss. As mentioned already, Gleeson 
CJ classified the claim in this way, and this characterisation was central to his 
                                            
109 Ibid at [411]. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid at [172] per Kirby J, quoting Johnson v University Hospitals of Cleveland 540 NE 2d 
1370 at 1374 (1989). 
112 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [30]. 
113 Ibid at [315]. 
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final decision. Callinan J was of a similar view as to the nature of the loss,114 
and it was also classified in this way by the trial judge and all of the Court of 
Appeal.115 Finally, although Heydon J did not specifically categorise the loss, 
it seems that he may also have considered it to be economic loss.116  
 
By contrast, Kirby J considered the economic loss to be consequential only as 
it flowed from the physical injury to Mrs Melchior.117 Hayne J also did not 
categorise the claim as one of pure economic loss, although in addition, he 
argued against resolving this case by classifying the claim.118 McHugh and 
Gummow JJ agreed with the latter part of Hayne J’s conclusions as they 
declined to categorise the loss on the ground that it did not advance the 
understanding of the issues.119 Although the characterisation of this harm was 
complicated by the existence of Mr Melchior, who had suffered no physical 
loss,120 it is difficult to extract any valuable guidance from this case as to when 
a loss will considered to be purely economic. 
 
A final theme, and the one most pivotal to the outcome in this case, was the 
role of public policy. Although the different legal issues already discussed had 
a significant impact, underpinning all of that reasoning, often explicitly, were 
public policy arguments. All of the majority, as well as Hayne J, considered 
whether public policy justified departing from the ordinary principles of 
negligence to refuse to award these damages. The majority concluded that 
public policy did not warrant such a conclusion. By contrast, Hayne J 
regarded these considerations as determinative and refused to permit 
recovery of these damages. The remainder of the minority also relied heavily 
on public policy considerations. Although these considerations did not need to 
play a disqualifying role, given that their starting point was that recovery of 
these damages should be refused unless otherwise justified, public policy 
arguments were still used to support their views. Heydon J, in particular, relied 
heavily on these considerations.121 
 
Hence the weight assigned to public policy in this case was a marker for 
whether a judge was part of the majority or minority. Every judge in the 
majority rejected the application of public policy arguments because these 
reasons did not justify departing from established legal principle. Conversely, 
every judge in the minority relied heavily on public policy either to justify their 
conclusion to refuse these damages or to permit departure from the general 
rules of negligence. Interestingly, what might be regarded as one of the 
ironies of this case is that the less conservative position was arrived at by 
                                            
114 Ibid at [299]. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid at, for example, [319] and [411] which provide at least some indication that Heydon J 
may be assuming that the loss is economic loss. 
117 Ibid at [148]-[149]. 
118 Ibid at [193]. 
119 Ibid at [66]. 
120 Ibid. See, for example, the differing approaches of Gleeson CJ at [19] and Hayne J at 
[188]-[189]. 
121 See Kirby J’s criticism of what he regards as inappropriate reliance on public policy by 
some judges in the minority: Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [151]. 
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insisting on the application of established legal principle and by resisting 




In Queensland, Cattanach did not remain law for long. The day after the 
decision was handed down, the Attorney-General, Mr Rod Welford, stated his 
intention to introduce legislation to overrule the decision.122 That promise 
became law in November, when the Justice and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2003 (Qld) inserted Part 5 of Chapter 2 into the Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld). The Part states: 
 
“PART 5—AWARDS FOR ECONOMIC LOSS FOLLOWING 
STERILISATION PROCEDURE OR CONTRACEPTIVE PROCEDURE 
OR ADVICE 
 
“49A Failed sterilisation procedures 
 
(1) This section applies if, following a procedure to effect the 
sterilisation of an individual, the individual gives birth to, or fathers, a 
child because of the breach of duty of a person in advising about, or 
performing, the procedure. 
 
Examples of sterilisation procedures—  
Tubal ligation and vasectomy. 
 
(2) A court can not award damages for economic loss arising out of 
the costs ordinarily associated with rearing or maintaining a child.  
 
“49B Failed contraceptive procedure or contraceptive advice 
 
(1) This section applies if, following a contraceptive procedure on an 
individual or the giving of contraceptive advice to an individual, the 
individual gives birth to, or fathers, a child because of the breach of 
duty of a person in advising about, or performing, the procedure or 
giving the advice. 
 
(2) A court can not award damages for economic loss arising out of 
the costs ordinarily associated with rearing or maintaining a child.” 
 
When introducing the Bill, Mr Welford made clear that the amendment relates 
only to the cost of raising a healthy child and will not exclude claims for the 
additional cost associated with a child’s disability.123 Also of particular interest 
                                            
122 Queensland Acts to Protect Medical Sterilisation Services, Mr Rod Welford MP, Ministerial 
Media Statement, 17 July 2003, http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/cgi-bin/display-
statement.pl?id=13456&db=media viewed 27 August 2003. 
123 Hansard, 21 August 2003, p3177. 
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is s49B which goes further than simply overturning Cattanach. This section 
was added after the amending Bill was introduced into Parliament and also 
limits damages in situations where a child is born as a result of negligently 
performing or advising about a contraception procedure or giving negligent 
contraceptive advice.  
 
Queensland is not the only State to take legislative action following the 
decision, with New South Wales recently adding Part 11 to its Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW). This new Part seeks to achieve similar goals to the 
Queensland legislation although it takes a slightly different approach in that 
there is no reference to sterilisation or contraception. Instead, the amendment 
operates to restrict the awarding of damages in cases involving ‘a claim for 
the birth of a child’: s71(1). It also specifically excludes the awarding of 
damages not only for the cost of raising a child, but also any loss of earnings 
associated with that responsibility: s71(1).  
 
This legislation in Queensland and New South Wales is consistent with the 
recent tort reform trends that seek to restrict civil liability, and particularly the 
liability of the medical profession.124 Indeed, the primary reasons given by Mr 
Welford for introducing this amendment were concerns about the affordability 
of medical indemnity insurance and the related issue of ensuring the 
continued availability of these procedures.125 It will be interesting to see 
whether any future decisions of the High Court that do not accord with this 
trend of legislative reform will also receive Parliamentary attention. 
AN ENGLISH CASE 
 
A final further development is the recent decision in Rees v Darlington 
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (‘Rees’)126 where the House of Lords was 
invited to reconsider its decision in McFarlane. In Rees, a woman sought 
sterilisation because she considered that her visual disability would prevent 
her from raising a child properly. The operation was performed negligently 
and a healthy child was born as a result. The House of Lords affirmed its 
decision in McFarlane127 and, by a bare majority, refused to award damages 
for the additional cost of raising the child that was due to the mother’s 
disability. This decision sits uncomfortably with the English Court of Appeal 
decision in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS 
Trust,128 which permitted recovery for the additional cost of raising a child with 
a disability.  
 
                                            
124 See Kirby J’s uncomplimentary comments on the tort reform currently taking place in 
Australia: Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 at [137]. 
125 Hansard, 21 August 2003, p3177. 
126 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52 (16 October 2003). 
127 Although as discussed above, the affirmation of McFarlane was subject to an important 
gloss: that a legal wrong had still been suffered beyond the cost of the actual birth and that 
that wrong should be recognised by a conventional award of 15 000 pounds. 
128 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266. 
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How the law should treat disability in either the mother or the child is 
troublesome in this context, and this was evident in the difficulties that the 
English courts experienced after McFarlane, as noted by Kirby J in Cattanach. 
It may be that the courts will seek to remove the anomalies that exist in this 
area, with the end result being that Parkinson is overruled. Three of the 
majority in Rees have made their intentions relatively clear if the House of 
Lords is called upon to revisit the issue. Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead expressly rejected Parkinson, while Lord Scott of 
Foscote left the point open but doubted the correctness of that decision. 
Although the decision in Rees does not directly affect the law in Australia or in 
Queensland, this issue of disability does highlight some of the difficulties in 
this area. Given that the Queensland and New South Wales legislation create 
a dichotomy based on disability, any further development of this area of law in 
the United Kingdom should be watched closely. 
